by Medinat Abdulazeez Malefakis
The Boko Haram terrorist
insurgence in Nigeria’s north east came into global limelight in 2009 when the
group had a military confrontation with the Nigerian military forces. 10 years
later, the insurgent grouped which emerged from local grievances has morphed
into a trans-national terrorist organization. In 2015, Boko Haram was ranked
deadlier than the Islamic state according to the Global Terrorism Index. That
same year, the then newly elected Nigerian President, Muhammadu Buhari declared
that the terrorist group had been ‘technically defeated’.
This followed a string of
militarized counter-terrorist successes against the group which in essence
constrained it from carrying out sophisticated attacks outside of the
north-east. Hamstringing Boko Haram in 2015 was expected, as Buhari had made
the insecurity issues in the northeast a vocal point of his election campaign
against his opponent, former President Goodluck Jonathan. 4 years after, the
‘technically defeated’ Boko Haram still carries out deadly suicide attacks,
reportedly still controls territories in Borno and Yobe states where they collect
taxes and tolls from inhabitants of communities. 10 years of trying to defeat
Boko Haram’s terrorism has still not answered certain pertinent questions:
Who Killed Muhammad Yusuf?
When Boko Haram re-emerged in
2010 as the terrorist group we know today, they justified suicide bombings,
jail breaks and other terrorist attacks with the Nigerian government’s
inability to bring to book the killer of their slain leader, Muhammad Yusuf.
Attacks after attacks to demand for justice has still not produced a cogent
explanation for the extra-judicial murder of Boko Haram’s founder. The
continuous back-and-forth between the Nigerian Military and the Nigerian Police
eventually fettered out. The government of Borno state (Boko Haram’s epicenter)
was blamed for ‘improper handling’ of an accused terrorist but no government
official was charged for any wrong-doing. Killing Mohammed Yusuf, leaving his
body on the streets for onlookers and not bringing his killers to justice
continue to provoke sentimental reactions from Boko Haram members, and till
today, this killing is still a reference point for the group’s lack of trust in
the Nigerian government. While it may be considered “right” to eliminate a
terrorist and thus end a threat to public order, doing it with extra-judicial
killings is like fighting terrorism with terrorism. It plays into the hands of
the insurgents because it undermines the legitimacy that the Nigerian
government claims to have as opposed to the group. If Boko Haram claims that
the government of Nigeria is illegitimate, extra-judicial killings (if proven)
prove them right.
Is Militarized
Counter-Terrorism Working?
Operation Restore Order (I, II
and III), Operation BOYONA (Borno, Yobe, Nassarawa and Adamawa), Operation
Zaman Lafiya (Peaceful Coexistence), Operation Lafiya Dole (Compulsory Peace),
Operation Crackdown, Operation Gama Aiki (Finish the Job), Operation Safe
Corridor and Operation Last Hold are some of the militarized counter-terrorism
operations against Boko Haram since its inception. In the last 3 years, the
head of the counter-terrorist command has been changed 5 times. Soldiers on the
field are continuously going AWOL (Absent without Official Leave), citing the
lack of competitive weapons and bad welfare as justifications. The army bases in
the north east have suffered multiple, mostly successful attacks from the
terrorists. Borders between Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger remain porous,
enabling trans-border movement of insurgents to escape capture. All of these
recurring issues continue to mar little successes recorded by the military
forces that have been able to prevent the insurgents from carrying out
sophisticated attacks outside of Borno and Yobe states. Combining the military
prowess of affected countries in the Lake Chad Basin have proven to be a good
move, helping displaced communities to return to their homes. Unfortunately,
the success rate appears to continuously fizzle out as insurgents carry out one
successful soft target attack after another. The ability of Boko Haram to adapt
to different counter-terrorist operation and the divisive terrain in the
terrorist landscape behooves a rethinking of counter-terrorist measures to
match the increasing dynamics terrorist threat.
Which Boko Haram is the
Nigerian Government Fighting or Engaging with?
The first glimpse of a split in
Boko Haram ranks was in 2012 when the Ansaru group emerged. The split was
termed concessional, as Ansaru aligned more with Al Qaeda in action and form at
a time when Boko Haram tilted towards ISIS for support and recognition. A more
pronounced ideological split occurred in 2016, when Abu Musab Al-Barnawi was
pronounced by ISIS as the head of its West African Province (ISWAP).
Al-Barnawi, Muhammad Yusuf’s son and his brother took control of a faction of
Boko Haram from AbubakarShekau, Yusuf’s deputy who led Boko Haram after their
father’s death. Both have accused Shekau of being totalitarian, power-drunk,
too extreme and self-centered. ISWAP under Al-Barnawi have gone on to clearly
distinguish itself from Shekau’s Boko Haram in ideology and modus operandi.
Unlike Shekau who kidnapped about 300 school girls from Chibok and went ahead
to use them as bargaining chips against the Nigerian government, ISWAP
returned, unharmed, all but 1 of the 100 school girls kidnapped in Dapchi
because ‘the kidnap cast them in bad light as a group’. The kidnap appears to
have been a mistake in the first place. While Boko Haram employs suicide
attacks on soft targets, ISWAP have attacked majorly military bases just as
Boko Haram did in its early years. In contrast to Boko Haram’s forceful
recruitment, ISWAP appears to solicit support from local communities through
‘peacefully enforced’ control and revival of economic activities such as the
fish trade along the Lake Chad Basin.
The split in Boko Haram ranks
shows that much is still unknown about the inner workings and structures of the
group. More so, it is unclear which of the groups the Nigerian government is
countering militarily or engaging with as the terrorism of each faction is
different and requires different counter-terrorism approaches. ISWAP appears
open to negotiations unlike Boko Haram, and the Nigerian government could use
this seemingly open window to correct the mistakes of botched negotiations in
the past. The answer to these questions would prove decisive in neutralizing
the potency of the terrorist threat in the Lake Chad Basin.
Where are the Remaining Chibok
Girls and Where is theDapchi Girl?
Much as ISWAP tries to
distinguish itself from Boko Haram, both have adopted kidnapping as a megaphone
tool utilized to amplify the popularity of ‘terrorist-style operations’ and
their capacity to instill fear in affected communities. Over 100 girls from
Shekau’s Boko Haram taken from Chibok, and Leah Sharibu, the last of the Dapchi
girls kidnapped by Barnawi’s ISWAP have not been returned. Neither the
popularity of the Chibok kidnapping, nor the fervent return pleas from the
Dapchi abductions have yielded efforts at bringing the girls back. Shekau
claims that while some of the girls were killed by the Nigerian military’s air
raids, the remaining either have been married off to Boko Haram members and
soldiers, or sold into slavery. ISWAP on their part proclaimed that Leah
Sharibu’s refusal to denounce Christianity and accept Islam is the reason why
she was not released with the other girls. Global confidence in the government
to find and return the remaining girls is dwindling. Because the abducted girls
are the ‘golden’ chips of the insurgents, they wiggle them in the faces of the
Nigerian government and other partners and agencies who try to negotiate for
their release.Reports of ransom payments and release of Boko Haram prisoners in
exchange for the girls continue to diminish hopes in the government’s capacity,
while simultaneously emboldening further, less popular kidnappings in the
northeast of Nigeria.
How is Boko Haram Funded?
Analysts believe that tracing the
source of funding for terrorist organization is an integral step to
neutralizing such organizations. For 10 years however, exact information as to
where and how Boko haram finances it activities have been sketchy to say the
least. Before it became a violent force, personal contribution from members and
supporters sustained the group and its activities. Between 2009 and 2016, Boko
Haram engaged in bank robberies and kidnapping of expats to finance itself.
Kidnapping of expats was also used as bargaining chips to get captured members
released. When it became incapable of executing high-profile kidnappings, Boko
Haram reportedly coerced/threatened the populace in certain communities such as
Goza, Maiduguri and Mubi into donating to the groups cause or risk attack.
Since going guerrilla, Boko Haram’s funding mechanisms have been surrounded by
speculations. From engaging in illegal, cross-border trades in illicit drugs to
smuggling and human trafficking. Shekau himself once admitted to selling some
of the Chibok girls into slavery. Boko Haram, and just recently ISWAP have also
been credited to control the fish trade across Baga, northeast’s major fishing
market by levying transportation and other tolls on fishermen and fish traders.
All of these speculations do not
however justify Boko Haram’s acquisition of sophisticated weapons, some of
which the Nigerian military allegedly do not possess in its arsenal. Apart from
weapons acquisition, logistics for continuous movement and evacuation of whole
terrorist cells require huge financial investment. So also does maintaining a
stream of support group in and outside of the organization. For all of these
and more, where do Boko Haram and ISWAP get financial resources? Not knowing
the answers to this question continues to indirectly justify the claims that
Boko Haram was/is a creation and financial beneficiary of certain elites interested
in making the Nigerian polity ‘ungovernable’ for the government in power.
Stopping the money from flowing is a very (if not the most) effective and
non-militarized way to stop the insurgent activities. And it does not involve
any casualties, be they on the side of the insurgents or the local population.
What Exactly Does Boko Haram
Want?
This question bemuses all claims
and counter claims about the reasons why Boko Haram exist as a group. Attacking
all representations of government such as the army presents it as an insurgent
group. Its anti-western/anti-modernization ideology posits it as a
fundamentalist religious Islamic group, but its killings of prominent Islamic
scholars who oppose their ideology such as AuwalAlbani Zaria lends doubtful
credence to the authenticity of its Islamic tenets. Insisting on proclaiming an
Islamic State in a multi-religious entity such as Nigeria does not demonstrate
a feasible terrorist agenda, and the facelessness of the group further impedes
successful negotiations. 10 years on, what would clearly and pragmatically
bring Boko Haram/ISWAP to an end still remains a mystery.
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